A new split β‐lactamase assay promises experimental testing of the interplay of protein stability and function. Proteins are sufficiently stable to act effectively within cells. However, mutations generally destabilize structure, with effects on free energy that are comparable to the free energy of folding. Assays of protein functionality and stability in vivo enable a quick study of factors that influence these properties in response to targeted mutations. These assays can help molecular engineering but can also be used to target important (...) questions, including why most proteins are marginally stable, how mutations alter structural makeup, and how thermodynamics, function, and environment shape molecular change. Processes of self‐organization and natural selection are determinants of stability and function. Non‐equilibrium thermodynamics provides crucial concepts, e.g., cells as emergent energy‐dissipating entities that do work and build their own parts, and a framework to study the sculpting role of evolution at different scales. (shrink)

Most analytic epistemologists, foundationalists and coherentists alike, have rejected the possibility of an infinitely long, non-recurring regress of justified beliefs. it is instructive to inquire why this notion has received nearly universal condemnation. in a review of recent work six sorts of arguments against infinite justificatory chains are examined. it is concluded firstly that, while regresses in which each belief is justified solely via relations to further beliefs cannot exist, the impossiblity of other sorts of infinite justificatory chains has not (...) been shown, and secondly that there may nevertheless be sound methodological reasons for provisionally rejecting the infinite regress possibility while more satisfactory alternatives are explored. (shrink)

Christopher D. Stone has claimed that natural objects can and should have rights. I accept Stone’s premise that the possession of rights is tied to the possession of interests; however, I argue that the concept of a natural object needs a more careful analysis than is given by Stone. Not everything that Stone calls a natural object is an object “naturally.” Some must be taken as artificial rather than as natural. Thistype of object cannot be said to have intrinsic interests (...) and hence cannot be given rights that can protect “its own sake”-which is the sort of right that Stone focuses on. Further, there are other sorts of natural objects which, although they are objects “naturally,” cannot meaningfully be said to have intrinsic interests, and thus cannot have the sorts of rights that Stone is concerned with. Finally, there are other sorts of natural objects which are objects naturally and which have intrinsic interests, but which are not proper candidates for the possession of rights. The prerequisites for being “owed” rights are the possession of intrinsic interests and the capability to suffer when those interests are interfered with or denied or threatened. (shrink)

Entrepreneurship is the dominant form of enterprise in conflict-affected settings, yet little is known about the role of entrepreneurship in peacebuilding. In response, this article undertakes a review of entrepreneurship in conflict-affected regions to integrate research from business and management with research from political science, international relations, and parallel domains. Three views of entrepreneurship emerge—the destructive view, economic view, and social cohesion view—showing how entrepreneurship can concurrently create conflict but also potentially generate peace. The article identifies new avenues for pro-peace (...) entrepreneurship: namely, through personal transformation, social contributions, inclusive interactions, conflict trigger removal, intergroup policy persuasion, and acting as legal champions. This article also discusses several pathways forward for business-for-peace research alongside additional implications for the deployment of business-based support programs in conflict settings. (shrink)

Catholics and libertarians make strange bedfellows. They sharply disagree on many issues. However, when it comes to intellectual property rights, they are surprisingly congruent, albeit for different reasons. The present paper traces out the agreement on patents between these two very different philosophies.

The field of “business for peace” recognizes the role that businesses can play in peacebuilding. However, like much of the discussion concerning business in conflict zones, it has prioritized the view of multinationals, often overlooking the role of indigenous local firms. The economic, social, and intergroup dynamics experienced by local businesses in conflict zones are understudied, with the current paper beginning by positioning micro- and small enterprises in the peacebuilding debate, then engaging with multidisciplinary works to understand how they foster (...) peace. Through a case study set in north Lebanon, we conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty-three MSE owners in one industry who operate across sectarian divisions and with recently displaced Syrian refugees. Our findings indicate that local business activity can simultaneously promote peace and foster conflict, with peacebuilding improved when intergroup differences are reduced within the operating environment. Furthermore, the importance of economic development was elevated for local businesses, suggesting that peace through mechanisms such as social development, the rule of law, and training, is only achieved if economic needs are alleviated through these measures. We conclude by citing how contextual factors in conflict zones can enhance intergroup differences, and how resolving such factors can promote peacebuilding, with further empirical work needed in this area. (shrink)

The current study uses a sensemaking model and thinking strategies identified in earlier research to examine ethical decision making. Using a sample of 163 undergraduates, a low-fidelity simulation approach is used to study the effects personal involvement (in causing the problem and personal involvement in experiencing the outcomes of the problem) could have on the use of cognitive reasoning strategies that have been shown to promote ethical decision making. A mediated model is presented which suggests that environmental factors influence reasoning (...) strategies, reasoning strategies influence sensemaking, and sensemaking in turn influences ethical decision making. Findings were mixed but generally supported the hypothesized model. It is interesting to note that framing the outcomes of ethically charged situations in terms of more global organizational outcomes rather than personal outcomes was found to promote the use of pro-ethical cognitive reasoning strategies. (shrink)

Questions have been raised on what role the knowledge provided by sustainability science actually plays in the transition to sustainability and what role it may play in the future. In this paper we investigate different approaches to sustainability transformation of food systems by analyzing the rationale behind transformative acts-the ground that the direct agents of change act upon- and how the type of rationale is connected to the role of research and how the agents of change are involved. To do (...) this we employ Max Weber’s distinction between instrumental rationality and value-rationality in social action. In particular, we compare two different approaches to the role of research in sustainability transformation: (1) Performance-based approaches that measure performance and set up sustainability indicator targets and benchmarks to motivate the agents in the food system to change; (2) Values-based approaches that aim at communicating and mediating sustainability values to enable coordinated and cooperative action to transform the food system. We identify their respective strengths and weaknesses based on a cross-case analysis of four cases, and propose that the two approaches, like Weber’s two types of rationality, are complementary-because they are based on complementary observer stances—and that an optimal in-between approach therefore cannot be found. However, there are options for reflexive learning by observing one perspective-and its possible blind spots-from the vantage point of the other, so we suggest that new strategies for sustainability transformation can be found based on reflexive rationality as a third and distinct type of rationality. (shrink)

Polyphenic differences between individuals arise not through differences at the genome level but as a result of specific cues received during development. Polyphenisms often involve entire suites of characters, as shown dramatically by the polyphenic castes found in many social insect colonies. An understanding of the genetic architecture behind polyphenisms provides a novel means of studying the interplay between genomes, gene expression and phenotypes. Here we discuss polyphenisms and molecular genetic tools now available to unravel their developmental bases in insects. (...) We focus on several recent studies that have tracked gene‐expression patterns during social insect caste determination. BioEssays 23:62–68, 2001. Published 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

In this essay I first provide an analysis of various community concepts. Second, I evaluate two of the most serious challenges to the existence of communities—gradient and paleoecological analysis respectively—arguing that, properly understood, neither threatens the existence of communities construed interactively. Finally, I apply the same interactive approach to ecosystem ecology, arguing that ecosystems may exist robustly as well. ‡I would like to thank to the participants at the Ecology and Environmental Ethics Conference at the University of Utah, the Philosophy (...) of Ecology Conference hosted by the University of Brisbane, and those participants in a session at the Philosophy of Science Association Meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia for helpful discussions of this essay. Specific thanks go to Mark Colyvan, Greg Cooper, Steve Downes, Chris Elliott, Marc Ereshefsky, Paul Griffiths, Jesse Hendrikse, Greg Mikkelson, Anya Plutynski, Kate Ritchie, Sahotra Sarkar, Kim Sterelny, and Rob Wilson. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Lewis and Clark College, 0615 SW Palatine Hill Road, Portland, OR 97219; e-mail: jay@lclark.edu. (shrink)

The posterior parietal cortex and frontal eye field contain maps of visual salience on which the decision to choose a saccade may be based. However, an averaging express saccade is not represented by a victorious unimodal representation in the superior colliculus. Normalization as described by Findlay & Walker is not necessary for the generation of saccades.

The use of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) by US consumers has grown in recent years. CAM therapies often utilize medicinal herbs as part of the treatment process; however, research on US practitioner preferences for medicinal herbs is limited, despite growing concern surrounding the sustainability of wild-harvested medicinal herbs. In order better to understand consumer preferences for this emerging market, a mail survey of US practitioners (licensed acupuncturists) was conducted to examine the importance of five herb attributes in practitioners’ herb (...) selection decisions: (1) country of origin, (2) freshness, (3) production method (organic versus conventional), (4) price, and (5) traceability. The significance of these five traits is investigated using discrete choice analysis, and the implications for US medicinal herb growers are discussed. (shrink)

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the cognitive achievement that enables us to report our propositional attitudes, to attribute such attitudes to others, and to use such postulated or observed mental states in the prediction and explanation of behavior. Most normally developing children acquire ToM between the ages of 3 and 5 years, but serious delays beyond this chronological and mental age have been observed in children with autism, as well as in those with severe sensory impairments. We examine data from (...) studies of ToM in normally developing children and those with deafness, blindness, autism and Williams syndrome, as well as data from lower primates, in a search for answers to key theoretical questions concerning the origins, nature and representation of knowledge about the mind. In answer to these, we offer a framework according to which ToM is jointly dependent upon language and social experience, and is produced by a conjunction of language acquisition with children's growing social understanding, acquired through conversation and interaction with others. We argue that adequate language and adequate social skills are jointly causally sufficient, and individually causally necessary, for producing ToM. Thus our account supports a social developmental theory of the genesis of human cognition, inspired by the work of Sellars and Vygotsky. How are we to decide whether to take reason to be an essentially private thing that can, however, turn on a public display when it chooses to do so, or, like conversing, to be an essentially social skill, which can, however, be retained a while through periods of solitary confinement? (Annette Baier, The Commons of the Mind, p. 5). The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well (Wittgenstein, On Certainty§ 287). The problem of thought and language thus extends beyond the limits of natural science and becomes the focal problem of historical human psychology, i.e. of social psychology. Consequently, it must be posed in a different way (Vygotsky, Thought and Language, p. 51). From the very first days of the child's development his activities acquire a meaning of their own in a system of social behaviour and, being directed towards a definite purpose, are refracted through the prism of the child's environment. The path from object to child and from child to object passes through another person. This complex human structure is the product of a developmental process deeply rooted in the links between individual and social history (Vygotsky, Mind in Society, p. 30). (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for four related claims. First, Richard Levins’ classic “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology” was a statement and defense of theoretical population biology growing out of collaborations between Robert MacArthur, Richard Lewontin, E. O. Wilson, and others. Second, I argue that the essay served as a response to the rise of systems ecology especially as pioneered by Kenneth Watt. Third, the arguments offered by Levins against systems ecology and in favor of his own (...) methodological program are best construed as “pragmatic”. Fourth, I consider limitations of Levins’ arguments given contemporary population biology. (shrink)

Recently, there has been a rise in pessimism concerning what theoretical ecology can offer conservation biologists in the formation of reasonable environmental policies. In this paper, I look at one of the pessimistic arguments offered by Kristin Shrader-Frechette and E. D. McCoy (1993, 1994)--the argument from conceptual imprecision. I suggest that their argument rests on an inadequate account of the concepts of ecological stability and that there has been conceptual progress with respect to complexity-stability hypotheses. Such progress, I maintain, can (...) supply important resources for conservation biologists in determining environmental policies. (shrink)

Philosophers of the life sciences have devoted considerably more attention to evolutionary theory and genetics than to the various sub-disciplines of ecology, but recent work in the philosophy of ecology suggests reflects a growing interest in this area (Cooper 2003; Ginzburg and Colyvan 2004). However, philosophers of biology and ecology have focused almost entirely on conceptual and methodological issues in population and community ecology; conspicuously absent are foundational investigations in ecosystem ecology. This situation is regrettable. Ecosystem concepts play a central (...) role in many branches of theoretical and applied ecology, and in environmental literature generally. Indeed, for some historians, the division of ecological theory into population-community and ecosystem research traditions, and the methodological and conceptual debates that have arisen between workers in these respective camps, is the distinguishing feature of 20th century ecological science (Hagen 1992). These include debates over, among others: reductionistic vs. holistic research methodologies; the existence and metaphysics of ecological “kinds”; the relationship between evolutionary mechanisms and ecosystem phenomena; and the nature and scope of ecological science and its relationship to other branches of natural and social science. Philosophers of ecology have written on all these topics, but almost exclusively from the theoretical perspective of population, community or evolutionary ecology. Philosophical attention to these issues from the perspective of ecosystem ecology is long overdue. It would be misleading to assert that philosophers in general have ignored ecosystem ecology. Environmental philosophers, including environmental ethicists so-called “radical” environmental philosophers (deep ecologists, social ecologists, ecofeminists, etc.), and policy theorists, have had a long-standing interest in ecosystem ecology (e.g. Callicott 1986; Cahen 1988; Warren and Cheney 1993; Westra 1994; Sagoff 1997; Fitzsimmons 1999).. (shrink)

According to Hume, the idea of a persisting, self-identical object, distinct from our impressions of it, and the idea of a duration of time, the mere passage of time without change, are mutually supporting "fictions". Each rests upon a "mistake", the commingling of "qualities of the imagination" or "impressions of reflection" with "external" impressions (perceptions), and, strictly speaking, we are conceptually and epistemically entitled to neither. Among Kant's aims in the First Critique is the securing of precisely these entitlements. Like (...) Hume, he acknowledges the correlativity of the notions of temporal duration and persisting self-identical objects (i.e., continuant substances). Unlike Hume, however, he undertakes to establish the legitimacy or objective validity of the schematized category of substance and, correspondingly, of the representation of time as a formal unity with duration as one of its modes. (shrink)

This paper examines several decision-making models that have been proposed to limit the use of CPR for COVID-19 patients. My main concern will be to assess proposals for the implementation of unilateral DNRs — i.e., orders to withhold CPR without the agreement of patients or their surrogates.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 67-76 [Access article in PDF] Double Religious Belonging:A Process Approach Jay McDaniel Hendrix College Increasingly, Christians in the United States are turning to Buddhism for spiritual insight and nourishment. Many are reading books about Buddhism, and some are also meditating, participating in Buddhist retreats, and studying under Buddhist teachers. As they do so, they approach what might be called "dual religious belonging."The phrase itself can (...) suggest at least three metaphors. We can imagine them (1) as people crossing a bridge into the world of Buddhism and who then return to Christianity with fresh insights; or (2) as people with two intravenous tubes in their arms, one providing fluid from a Buddhist lineage and one providing fluid from a Christian lineage, for the sake of a more complete life; or, shifting to a more organic metaphor, (3) as people with primary roots in Christian soil but with secondary roots in Buddhist soil, who receive anchorage and sustenance from both kinds of soils.Shortly I will draw upon the third metaphor to suggest the desirability of a "taproot" as opposed to a "fibrous" approach for such double belonging, at least in its initial stages. First, a word is in order about the philosophical backdrop for my approach, which draws upon the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and its theological counterpart, process theology. Toward this end, I will draw upon the first metaphor: the bridge. A Bridge for Double Belonging Process theology emerged in the 1930s at the University of Chicago and has since been used by many Christians and some Buddhists, mainly but not exclusively Pure Land Buddhists, to interpret their respective religious perspectives. I myself have used this theology in several books to try to show how Christians can draw deeply from the wells of Buddhist insight and practice in ways that enrich and deepen Christian life.Process theology draws upon the "philosophy of organism" developed by the late philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead's philosophy is unique in that it has deep similarities with numerous Buddhist points of view even as it also offers a rich way of interpreting and appreciating core Christian insights. [End Page 67] It is no accident that process theologians such as John Cobb suggest that process theology is a way of seeing things—a theological bridge—that can help a Christian cross over into Buddhism, learn from it in deep ways, and return with fresh insights that enrich a walk with Christ; and that can also help Buddhists cross over into Christianity, learn from it in deep ways, and return with fresh insights for practicing the dharma.What, then, are the core teachings of process theology? If we imagine process theology as a wooden bridge, here would be ten of its planks:There are many worlds beyond words, which can be known in many ways, including prayer and meditation, empathy and imagination, intuition and mindful perception.Human life consists of a series of moments of experience, each of which includes, and is dependent on, the whole of the universe.The universe is an unfolding process that is never the same at two instants.Humans and other living beings have no substantial or permanent self that separates them from the surrounding world.Ultimate reality is a nonstatic and nondualistic Emptiness of which all things are manifestations: with Emptiness referring to (a) the emptiness of words and concepts as adequate descriptions of things as they are, (b) the sheer presence of things as they are in their suchness, (c) the absence of a self-contained substantiality or "own being" within things, (d) the sheer interconnectedness of all things, (e) the pure becoming of all things.There is a womblike presence—God—who shares in the joys and sufferings of each living being, and who is herself an example of no-self, interdependence, pure becoming, of the Emptiness described above.God is present within each living being an in-dwelling lure toward wisdom and compassion.God's presence is also found between humans, when they live in community with one another in a... (shrink)

Offers an internalist and perspectivalist reading of G. E. Moore's epistemological views. Challenges Barry Stroud's influential interpretation and defends Moore's rejection of scepticism, his ‘defence of common sense’ and his ‘proof of an external world’ against Stroud's criticisms. The conception of knowledge‐yielding enquiry, as addressed to determinate questions, within a setting of defeasible agreements regarding epistemic methods, norms, and background beliefs, is worked out in greater detail.

This paper briefly surveys several prominent modeling approaches to knowledge-based intelligent systems design and, especially, expert systems and the breakthroughs that have most broadened and improved their applications. We argue that the implementation of technology that aims to emulate rudimentary aspects of human intelligence has enhanced KBIS design, but that weaknesses remain that could be addressed with existing research in cognitive science. For example, we propose that systems based on representational plasticity, functional dynamism, domain specificity, creativity, and concept learning, with (...) their theoretical and experimental rigor, can best characterize the problem-solving capabilities of humans and can best overcome five key limitations currently exhibited by knowledge-based intelligent systems. We begin with a brief survey of the relevant work related to KBIS design and then discuss these five shortcomings with new suggestions for how to integrate results from cognitive science to resolve each of them. Our ultimate goal is to increase awareness and direct attention to areas of theoretical and experimental cognitive research that are fundamentally relevant to the goals underlying KBISes. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars' conclusion in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" that "the Given" is a "Myth" quickly elicited philosophical opposition and remains contentious fifty years later. William Alston has challenged that conclusion on several occasions by attempting to devise an acceptable account of perception committed to the givenness of perceived objects. His most recent challenge advances a "Theory of Appearing" which posits irreducible non-conceptual relations, ostensibly overlooked by Sellars, e.g., of "looking red", between the subject and the object perceived, that (...) can playa justificatory role vis-à-vis the corresponding beliefs, e.g., that the object is red. I argue that Alston undermines his positive plausibility arguments by first blurring and then ignoring crucial differencesamong various looks-concepts, and that his own putative "phenomenal" looks-concept demonstrably cannot play the justificatory role that he envisions for it. Both his critique of Sellars' arguments and his own alternative proposal thus fail on all fronts. (shrink)

Grelling’s Paradox is the paradox which results from considering whether heterologicality, the word-property which a designator has when and only when the designator does not bear the word-property it designates, is had by ‘ ȁ8heterologicality’. Although there has been some philosophical debate over its solution, Grelling’s Paradox is nearly uniformly treated as a variant of either the Liar Paradox or Russell’s Paradox, a paradox which does not present any philosophical challenges not already presented by the two better known paradoxes. The (...) aims of this paper are, first, to offer a precise formulation of Grelling’s Paradox which is clearly distinguished from both the Liar Paradox and Russell’s Paradox; second, to offer a solution to Grelling’s Paradox which both resolves the paradoxical reasoning and accounts for unproblematic predications of heterologicality; and, third, to argue that there are two lessons to be drawn from Grelling’s Paradox which have not yet been drawn from the Liar or Russell’s Paradox. The first lesson is that it is possible for the semantic content of a predicate to be sensitive to the semantic context; i.e., it is possible for a predicate to be an indexical expression. The second lesson is that the semantic content of an indexical predicate, though unproblematic for many cases, can nevertheless be problematic in some cases. (shrink)

Workplace ethics perceptions drive ethical behaviors, but our understanding of how context shapes the nature of this relationship is limited. Consequently, this article uses contingency theory to explore how perceptions of ethical priorities in the workplace—ethical work climate (EWC)—are differentially associated with ethical behavior based on the broader context. Specifically, we meta-analytically test theoretically relevant cultural values (i.e., collectivism, power distance) and work context factors (i.e., consequence of errors, job autonomy) as moderators of the connection between EWC perceptions and ethical (...) behavior. Our findings reveal that while higher power-distance societal contexts strengthen the connection between EWC perceptions and ethical behavior, work contexts with higher autonomy _weaken_ the connection. We found mixed support for collectivism as a contextual moderator, with results supporting theoretical expectations with one cultural conceptualization but not another. Contrary to expectations, the consequences of errors in work contexts did not moderate the association between EWC perceptions and ethical behavior. Taken together, this meta-analytic investigation highlights the meaningful role of the broader organizational context as a potential boundary condition for the influence of EWC perceptions on ethical behavior. (shrink)

This paper addresses the apparent difficulty experienced by philosophers in applying the methodology of art criticism to the aesthetics of nature and uses the idea of 'narrative' to explore it. A short poem is chosen which recounts the 'narrative' of a simple natural process – the passage of day into night – and this is followed by a simplified critique illustrating how the poem invites questions relating to style, technique, subject, etc., leading to the query whether the art form (poem) (...) can be dispensed with and the subject (nature) be left to tell its own story, using the 'language' of symbolism. The interface between art and science is reviewed particularly in the light of the ideas of John Dewey and what has happened since. The 'symbolism of environmental opportunity' is proposed as the key to crossing the arts/science boundary, and the question is raised whether the distinctiveness of nature is of paramount importance in this context. Various grounds for scepticism are examined, e.g. the danger of drawing inferences about human interaction with nature from the behaviour of other species. (shrink)

In Atlas (1991, 1993, 1996b) I argued that sentences containing the generalized quantifier NP ‘only a’ , where ‘a’ is an individual constant, in sentences like ‘Only God can make a tree’, ‘Only Muriel voted for Hubert’[Horn 1969], sometimes license Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) like ever and minimizer NPIs like give…a red cent and sometimes do not, as the data in (1a), (2a), (3a), and (4) show. Data from Horn (1996b) and McCawley (1981, 1988) showed that ‘only a’ would license (...) some minimizer NPIs, e.g. (5). In fact the only data that Horn (2005) presents to defend the view that ‘only a’ is a NPI licenser are examples containing the minimizers lift a finger, gives a hoot, and at all. But it is only on the grounds of the distributional evidence of licensing minimizer NPIs that Horn (e.g. Horn 2005) calls ‘only a’ a “negative” generalized quantifier NP. (shrink)

Workplace ethics perceptions drive ethical behaviors, but our understanding of how context shapes the nature of this relationship is limited. Consequently, this article uses contingency theory to explore how perceptions of ethical priorities in the workplace—ethical work climate (EWC)—are differentially associated with ethical behavior based on the broader context. Specifically, we meta-analytically test theoretically relevant cultural values (i.e., collectivism, power distance) and work context factors (i.e., consequence of errors, job autonomy) as moderators of the connection between EWC perceptions and ethical (...) behavior. Our findings reveal that while higher power-distance societal contexts strengthen the connection between EWC perceptions and ethical behavior, work contexts with higher autonomy weaken the connection. We found mixed support for collectivism as a contextual moderator, with results supporting theoretical expectations with one cultural conceptualization but not another. Contrary to expectations, the consequences of errors in work contexts did not moderate the association between EWC perceptions and ethical behavior. Taken together, this meta-analytic investigation highlights the meaningful role of the broader organizational context as a potential boundary condition for the influence of EWC perceptions on ethical behavior. (shrink)

Mental representation is a metaphor. It has perhaps become so entrenched that it appears to have been frozen, and it is easy to lose sight of its metaphorical character. Literally, a representation is a re-presentation, a symbol that stands for something else because that thing can’t be with us. I send my parents photos of the grandchildren because e-mail is cheaper than air tickets. I consult a map of Adelaide to find the shortest route to the philosophy department because wandering (...) through the streets would take too much time. Perhaps in a similar sense I use words in this discussion because the very ideas in my head have no way of being transferred directly to yours. It is tempting to think that when you hear them thoughts in your head substitute in further processing for the sounds I produce or for the words they encode. But if I am right in what follows, we should resist this temptation. (shrink)